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THE STOCK MARKET AND EARLY 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT* 
GEORGE BITTL1NGMA YER 
University of California, Davis 
THE turn-of-the-century struggle over trusts and corporations gave birth 
to industrial economics. In fact, that era's hotly debated questions— 
predation, merger, vertical restrictions, federal incorporation, and patent 
licensing—have an eerie familiarity. But one topic has never been fol-
lowed up: did trust-busting hurt the stock market, as many critics claimed 
at the time? 
At one level, the answer is clear. Filing suits against large corporations 
and threatening to break them up and force changes in the way they do 
business is bound to lower their value. The stock prices of actual defen-
dants, likely targets, and firms whose business plans or hopes of merger 
are spoiled should all drop. The idea also has a stellar endorsement: 
Irving Fisher chalked up the boom market of the 1920s to restrained 
antitrust. 1 But today the notion seems bold, bizarre, and obviously false. 
To many economists, antitrust is a sometimes misguided but basically 
sound and minor part of government economic policy. 
The statistical work in this article links federal antitrust filings and ten 
stock-price indexes over the period 1904-14, from the revival of antitrust 
under Teddy Roosevelt to the passage of the Clayton Act and the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) Act. My strategy is to exploit the instability of 
enforcement in the intervening years, an instability that seems to have 
been generated by the volatile politics of the trust question. 
* I am grateful for c o m m e n t s at the Universi ty of California (Davis, Los Angeles, and 
San ta Barba ra ) . Washington Universi ty (St. Louis) . Vanderbilt University, the Federal 
Reserve Board , the Federal Trade Commiss ion, George Mason Law School, Cornell Uni-
versi ty, Ohio State Univers i ty , the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank, and the National 
Bureau of Economic Research Macro History Workshop . Special thanks go to Brad Barber, 
Lee Benham, John Mat susaka , David Rocke , Bob Smiley, Ted Snyder, Michael Waldman, 
Richard Wydick . and an a n o n y m o u s referee. Harold Mulherin provided the daily Dow data, 
and Barry Stiefel collected the firm-level s tock prices. The Olin Foundation supported work 
on this article through a grant to the Center for the Study of the Economy and the State. 
1 Irving Fisher , The Stock Market C ra sh—and After, 101, 106, 110 (1930). Also see the 
remarks of Wesley Clair Mitchell , Business Cycles (1913). 
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FIGURE 1.—The Dow Industrials, industrial production, the Cowles industrial index, and 
the number of federal antitrust case filings (from top to bot tom), 1903-14. 
Figure 1 presents some of the relevant data: the Dow Jones Industrial 
Index, industrial production, and the Cowles industrial index—all in nat-
ural logs—as well as the number of cases filed. The spikes in enforcement 
in 1906 and 1907 and again in 1910, 1911, and 1912 seem to have been 
matched by declines in stock prices. Regression estimates in fact show 
that an extra case per month followed cumulative drops of major stock 
indexes of 1-3 percent. The timing makes sense since news of investiga-
tions and pending filings leaked out, often months in advance. These 
results are largely unchanged when I use current and future industrial 
production to control for factors not reflected in case filings. They are 
also stable across two subperiods, one covering Theodore Roosevelt 's 
celebrated trust-busting and the other covering enforcement under Wil-
liam Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson. Even industry indexes that in-
cluded no defendants experienced large declines. 
This article is organized as follows. Section I takes up the politics, 
enforcement, and court interpretation of antitrust for 1890-1914. Section 
II covers institutional and economic aspects of antitrust enforcement, 
discusses why I use antitrust case filings as my explanatory variable, and 
summarizes some leading theories of how antitrust might affect stock 
prices. Section III presents statistical results on the link between the Dow 
and case filings over short intervals, and Section IV presents estimates 
based on various monthly Cowles and Dow stock indexes and monthly 
case filings, as well as industrial production. Finally, Section V examines 
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collateral issues: did the stock price of an actual defendant also drop 
months ahead of the filing? Was that drop larger than for the aggregate 
indexes? Concluding comments follow. 
I. POLITICS, ENFORCEMENT, AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT 
A. The 1890s 
The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in July 1890 on the heels of 
agitation against the t rusts . 2 Its prohibition of combinations, contracts, 
and conspiracies in restraint of trade and monopolization was based on 
common law, and, in fact, some observers thought it simply codified the 
common law. 3 Early enforcement was sporadic, 4 and the Supreme 
Court's interpretation puzzling. In E. C. Knight, it said that merger was 
per se legal and sanctioned the New Jersey holding company law of 1889; 
but in two railroad cases and Addyston, the court then ruled that cartels 
were per se illegal and threw out common-law precedent. 5 This awkward 
posture caused many firms to merge between 1898 and 1902.6 The Addys-
ton defendants merged in 1898, even before their final, unsuccessful ap-
peal was over . 7 
2 See Hans B. Thorell i , The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradi-
tion, chs . 2 and 3 (1955); William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America: The 
Evolution of the Sherman Anti t rus t Act , ch. 3 (1965); and Lester G. Telser, A Theory of 
Efficient Coopera t ion and Compet i t ion , ch. 2 (1987). 
3 If t rue , Sena to r S h e r m a n ' s law may have been the "fig l e a f for the protectionist 
McKinley tariff, which S h e r m a n also pushed and lauded as the most important law passed 
by the 51st Congress . T h o m a s DiLorenzo , The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest Group 
Perspect ive , 5 lnt'1 Rev. L . & Econ . 73 (1985); and Thomas Hazlett . The Legislative History 
of the Sherman Act Re-examined , 30 Econ . Inq. 263 (1992). 
4 Cases were filed against a coal cartel, railroads, lumber dealers, the Sugar Trust, the 
Distilling and Catt le Feed Trus t , and unions over the period 1890-95. 
5 U . S . v. E .C . Knight 156 U . S . 1 (1895); U .S . v. Trans-Missouri 166 U .S . 312 (1897); 
U . S . v. Joint Traffic 171 U . S . 505 (1898); U . S . v. Addyston Pipe, 85 Fed. 271 (1898), 
mod 'd and a f f d , 175 U . S . 211 (1899). Mark Grady , Toward a Positive Economic Theory 
of Anti trust , 30 Econ . Inq. 225 (1992), views the rejection of common-law precedent as an 
error. 
6 Why did firms, in the absence of antitrust , prefer unstable cartels to stable merger? The 
answer may lie in the cost of merger . See George Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause 
the Great Merger Wave? 28 J. L a w & Econ . 77 (1985), for arguments and evidence. Scott 
E. Masten , J a m e s W. Meehan , & Edward A. Snyder, The Costs of Organization, 7 J. L. 
Econ. & Org. 1 (1991), find that mistaken vertical integration increases organizational costs 
about 70 percent . In cont ras t , John J. Binder. The Sherman Antitrust Act and the Railroad 
Cartels , 31 J. Law & E c o n . 443 (1988), finds little or no effect of the Trans-Missouri and 
Joint Traffic decisions on railroad s tocks , which is consistent with the view that the substi-
tute forms, such as merger, leasing, secret agreements and "communit ies of interest ," were 
relatively low-cost al ternatives to cartels and pools. 
7 George Bitt l ingmayer, Price-fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case, 5 Res. L . & Econ. 57 
(1983). 
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Piling irony on irony, William McKinley filed only three antitrust suits. 
His attorneys general pointed to E. C. Knight at every turn to explain 
why they stood helpless against the wave of mergers taking place on their 
watch. 8 When Theodore Roosevelt became president in September 1901, 
no case had been filed in over two years, but there was no lack of poten-
tial antitrust defendants. 9 Congress was also active on the trust ques-
tion. 1 0 The original " trusts" had disappeared, but the policy question had 
turned into the "trust and corporation problem." 
B. Roosevelt's First Term 
The Republicans put Roosevelt on their 1900 ticket to get him out of 
New York, where he was governor. Wall Street regarded him as a loose 
cannon, in part because of his position on antitrust. Stocks fell sharply 
when McKinley was shot in September 1901, again when he died, and 
then rebounded partly." I mention the rebound to give an accurate pic-
ture of the net movement. Table 1 shows the daily changes in the Dow 
for these and other selected events. In fact, the Dow remained at the 
lower postassassination level the rest of the month and took a long dive 
over the next two years as Roosevelt worked the trust question. The 
Dow reached its mid-1901 value only in late 1904, following a one-year 
suspension of antitrust suits. Roosevelt's trust-busting began in earnest 
with the March 1902 filing against the Northern Securities railroad merger 
and the suit in May against the Chicago meat packers. 1 2 The defendants 
in both cases were disliked, especially in the Midwest. 
New Jersey granted the Northern Securities charter on November 12, 
8 Letwin. supra note 2. at 137-42. 
9 State and private cases were filed, and reports of cartels appeared in the press. Thorel l i , 
supra note 2, at 260-65. Binder, supra note 6. at 448-449. mentions contemporary accoun t s 
of railroad agreements: and The Iron Age, December 13, 1900, at 13, reported the formation 
of a pool for cast-iron soil pipe. Other reports of cartels appear in Lewis Haney , Business 
Organization and Combination 154 (1914); and Henry R. Seager and Charles A. Gulick, 
Trust and Corporation Problems 90-92 (1929). 
1 0 It created the Industrial Commission " t o consider and amend legislation" and ap-
proved appropriations for an investigation of trusts in 1898. The House passed a p roposed 
constitutional amendment on trusts as well as a drastic amendment of the Sherman Act in 
mid-1900. Thorelli, supra note 2, at 355 and 510; and Eliot Jones , The Trust Problem in the 
United States 325-26 (1928). The amendment would have denied interstate t ranspor ta t ion to 
firms that hindered competition by increasing or decreasing prices. It passed 2 7 4 - 1 . 
1 1 For Wall Street reaction, see Henry F . Pringle. Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography 
237-38. 244-46 (1931); and William Henry Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility: The Life 
and Times of Theodore Roosevelt 153 (1961). Letwin, supra note 2, at 196; and Thorel l i , 
supra note 2, at 417, are also relevant. 
1 2 U .S . v. Northern Securities, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); and U .S . v. Armour & Co . , 142 Fed . 
808 (1906). 
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SELECTED EVENTS L I N K E D WITH THE TRUST ISSUE AND THE DAILY D O W RETURN 
Date 
Change 
Event in Dow (in %) 
September 6, 1901 Pres ident McKinley shot - 4 . 5 3 
September 14, 1901 McKin ley dies , Roosevel t becomes president - 4 . 3 6 
September 16, 1901 Rebound from McKin ley ' s death 4.02 
February 2, 1902 N o r t h e r n Securi t ies case announced - 1.31 
April 9, 1903 N o r t h e r n Securi t ies Court of Appeals decision - 2 . 4 9 
March 14, 1904 N o r t h e r n Securi t ies Supreme Cour t decision 2.61 
March 16, 1904 U . S . a t to rney general : " N o running amuck on 1.10 
t r u s t s " 
May 4, 1906 T h e o d o r e Rooseve l t ' s message on trusts 3.00 
June 22. 1906 A n n o u n c e m e n t of S tandard Oil investigation - 1 . 8 9 
March 7, 1907 S tandard Oil decision - 1 . 5 3 
March 14, 1907 R o o s e v e l t ' s ICC directive - 8 . 6 5 
March 15, 1907 R e b o u n d from March 14 6.48 
July 10, 1907 Amer i can T o b a c c o filed - 1 . 1 5 
July 30, 1907 DuPon t filed - 1 . 2 5 
August 3, 1907 S tandard fined for violating Elkins Act - 1.37 
October 22, 1907 G o v e r n m e n t rejects offer to settle Standard suit - 2 . 8 4 
N o v e m b e r 26, 1907 A t t o r n e y general on set t lement of Standard suit 2.61 
December 2, 1907 R o o s e v e l t ' s message on trusts 2.96 
March 25, 1908 Rooseve l t endorses Hepburn Bill 1.21 
July 7, 1908 S t a n d a r d ' s Elkins Act fine over turned .65 
December 17, 1908 President-e lect Taf t ' s speech on trust policy - 2 . 2 3 
April 30, 1909 At to rney genera l ' s speech on anti trust .03 
May 15, 1911 S tandard Oil Supreme Court decision 2.29 
May 29, 1911 Amer i can T o b a c c o court decision - . 9 9 
Sep tember 23, 1911 At to rney genera l ' s speech on antitrust - . 9 3 
October 7, 1911 Taf t ' s speech on antitrust - . 0 1 
October 27, 1911 U . S . Steel filed - 3 . 0 5 
April 30, 1912 In ternat ional Harves t e r filed - . 1 8 
Mean of all days . J anua ry 1897-July 1914 .011 
Standard deviation of all d a y s , January 1897-July 1914 .997 
Mean of 28 event days above - . 4 2 1 
Standard deviation of 28 event days above 3.043 
1901. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered hearings on 
the merger in December, Minnesota filed an antitrust suit to enjoin the 
consolidation in February, and the U.S. attorney general issued a state-
ment on February 19, 1902, contending that the merger violated the Sher-
man Act . 1 3 The filing itself took place on March 10, nineteen days after 
the attorney general 's announcement. 
1 3 B . H . Meyer . A His tory of the Nor thern Securit ies Case 258 (1 Bulletin of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, Economics and Political Science Series, No . 3, 1906) (reprinted by Da 
Capo Press , New York, 1972). 
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Roosevelt's deliberate goal was to overturn E. C. Knight. The Supreme 
Court did in fact vote 5-4 in March 1904 to declare the merger illegal but 
issued four separate opinions. The good news was that only four justices 
of the majority were prepared to prohibit all mergers of competitors— 
merger was not a per se violation. The bad news was that holding compa-
nies no longer provided shelter from the Sherman Act. Interestingly, 
Roosevelt's attorney general played down the favorable ruling. There 
would be no "running amuck" on corporate control. 1 4 Still, this muddled 
opinion revived the Sherman Act and laid the basis for future attacks on 
merged firms and the holding company. 1 5 
The Beef-Trust case followed an uproar caused by increases in the 
price of beef in early 1902. 1 6 The Expediting Act of 1903 and the founding 
of the Bureau of Corporations and the Antitrust Division were also major 
antitrust initiatives. 1 7 When the Dow dropped 13.7 percent in July 1903, 
some Wall Street critics blamed Roosevelt's push for publicity as a solu-
tion to the corporation problem. 1 8 Interestingly, no new cases were filed 
from September 1903 to December 1904, after the election, and the new 
Bureau of Corporations was largely idle. 
C. Roosevelt's Second Term 
After a three-year pause, Roosevelt resumed his trust-busting. The 
Chicago meat packers (July 1905), the Terminal Railroad Association 
1 4 N.Y. Times, March 16, 1904. Quoted in Pringle, supra note 11, at 352. Pringle surmises 
that a conciliatory pose was struck to keep campaign contributions flowing on the eve of 
the 1904 election. 
1 5 Robert Bork. The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 30 (1978), comments 
on "Justice Harlan's ineptitude in doctrinal d isputa t ion." Letwin, supra note 2, at 182: 
"The coming to age of the Sherman Act was marked by the Northern Securities c a s e . " 
Ernest Gellhorn, Antitrust Law and Economics 304 (1981), calls it " t h e starting point for 
a discussion of merger l aw." 
1 6 A series of articles in the New York Herald on March 31, April 1, and April 6, 1902, 
apparently stimulated the case. Thorelli, supra note 2, at 427. Meatpacking had been under 
attack since refrigerated rail transport allowed the geographic concentrat ion of the industry 
in Chicago. See Gary D. Libecap, The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of 
Meat Inspection and Antitrust, 30 Econ. Inq. 242 (1992). The only other cases filed during 
Roosevelt 's first term involved an alleged conspiracy of salt producers in the western states 
and a combination of wholesale grocers in Florida. 
1 7 Jeremiah Whipple Jenks & Walter E. Clark, The Trust Problem 230 and app . F-3 
(1929); and Letwin, supra note 2, at 216. 
1 8 Wall St. J.. August 12, 1903, at 1, criticized the New York Sun for linking Roosevel t ' s 
policies and the "Rich Man ' s Pan ic" of 1903. " T o connect President Roosevelt and the 
disturbed conditions in Wall Street as cause and effect is p repos terous . . . . The causes of 
the upheaval in Wall Street are well understood[:] . . . over-speculat ion and over-
capitalization." But after a decade of trust-busting, it took a different view. See text at note 
48 infra. 
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(December 1905), Otis Elevator (March 1906), Virginia-Carolina Chemi-
cal (May 1906), Standard Oil (November 1906), American Tobacco, Du-
Pont (both July 1907), and Union Pacific (November 1907), as well as a 
string of smaller firms, local associations, and cartels were targets. Sev-
eral of the suits sought divestiture as the remedy for alleged predation. 
The case against Standard, filed November 15, 1906, deserves special 
attention. Disgruntled oil interests had urged prosecution of Standard 
since the Sherman Act was passed. 1 9 After Ida Tarbell's articles on Stan-
dard appeared in the magazine McClure's in 1902, Roosevelt began crit-
icizing Standard publicly. 2 0 In the year and a half before the federal filing, 
at least fourteen states had filed suits of their own. 2 1 A May 1906 Bureau 
of Corporations report concluded that Standard used unfair methods, 
including railroad rebates, to gain advantage over its competitors. A 
string of newspaper articles called for prosecution, and the government 
announced a preliminary investigation on June 22, 1906. 2 2 
Matters went from bad to worse after the filing. A January 1907 ICC 
report concluded that Standard practiced local price cutting. Standard's 
jurisdictional challenge to the St. Louis circuit court was defeated in 
March, a second unfavorable report was issued by the Bureau of Corpo-
rations in May, and Standard lost state suits in May and June. It was 
fined $29 million on August 3 for violating the Elkins Act, 2 3 and the 
Bureau of Corporations issued a new report the same day castigating 
Standard for ' 'unreasonable" profits. 2 4 The possibility of criminal 
charges, raised in August and September, was another bad turn of events. 
Standard offered to settle, but the attorney general declined on October 
22 and informed Standard's directors on October 25 that the president 
was constitutionally obligated to proceed. 2 5 Up to that point, the Dow 
had dropped 25.6 percent from August 1, before the possibility of criminal 
1 9 Bruce Bringhurst , Anti t rust and the Oil Monopoly: The Standard Oil Cases , 1890-1911, 
at ch. 5 (1979). Telser , supra note 2, at 3 6 - 4 1 , finds that the margin between refined and 
crude oil decreased with the formation and growth of the Standard Trust in January 1882. 
2 0 Bringhurst , supra note 19, at 69. 
2 1 Ralph W. Hidy and Muriel E. Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 1882-1991, table 52, 
at 683 (1955). 
2 2 Malcolm R. Burns, T h e Compet i t ive Effects of Trust-busting: A Portfolio Analysis, 
85 J. Pol. Econ . 717, 731 (1977), finds that S tandard ' s market-corrected stock price fell 6.5 
percent in November 1906. Its pr ice, however , fell 22 percent over the previous year against 
a flat marke t . The November drop probably reflected only part of the total effects. 
2 3 " T h e heavy fine inflicted upon the Standard Oil Co . at Chicago was the one absorbing 
topic of conversat ion throughout the day, and other news was practically neglected." Wall 
St . J., August 6, 1907, at 4, col. 1. 
2 4 Wall St. J., August 5, 1907, at 6, col. 1. 
2 5 Bringhurst , supra note 19, at 135-36. 
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charges had been raised. It had dropped 38.1 percent below its January 
2 value. 
Roosevelt took other actions in 1907 that might have unsettled financial 
markets. 2 6 When the market dropped 8.3 percent on March 14, E. H. 
Harriman told reporters, " I would hate to tell you to whom I think you 
ought to go for an explanation of all t h i s . " 2 7 Roosevelt's March 15 direc-
tive to the ICC to investigate the railroads may have been the cause. 2 8 
The American Tobacco and DuPont filings were also seen as major as-
saults, 2 9 as was the proposed policy of putting antitrust violators in receiv-
ership. 3 0 
The charge that Roosevelt caused the panic was widespread. In fact, 
"appeals for modification or temporary suspension or compromise 
poured in upon him from many sources, including persons who had hith-
erto upheld his course." 3 1 James Day, chancellor of Syracuse University, 
crystallized this sentiment in his book, The Raid on Prosperity.22 Even 
the New York Times, which had supported the president's trust policy, 
feared that prosperity would be ruined by antitrust prosecutions. 3 3 Roose-
velt responded in August that it was not he but, rather, "certain malefac-
tors of great wealth" who had deliberately provoked the panic "in order 
to discredit the policy of the government." In January 1908 he blamed 
the recession on "the speculative folly and the flagrant dishonesty of a 
few men of great wealth." 3 4 
2 6 In fact, John D. Rockefeller predicted in January that Roosevelt 's at tacks on business 
would cause hard times. George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt . 1900-12, at 
'.16 (1958). 
2 7 Quoted in Harbaugh, supra note 11. at 310. 
2 8 " I t was President Roosevelt and nobody else who precipitated the panic of March 14." 
Wall St. J., July 2, 1907, at 6, col. 4. 
2 9 Wall St. J., July 10, 1907, at 1, and July 11, 1907, at 6. 
3 0 N.Y. Times, July 9, 1907, at 2; July 12, at 11; July 13, at 6; July 14, pt. 2, at 5. One 
article said Wall Street was hardened to financial shocks after two years of antitrust suits. 
N.Y. Times. July 11, 1907. at 2. 
5 1 Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time: Shown in His Own Letters 
35 (1920). Roosevelt spent a good deal of his time replying to these entreat ies . To New 
York banker Jacob Schiff on March 28: " I t is difficult for me to understand why there 
should be this belief in Wall Street that I am a wild-eyed revolut ionist ." Id. at 41 . 
3 2 James Day, The Raid on Prosperity (1907). See also Adolph Edwards , The Roosevelt 
Panic of 1907 (1907); and J. W. Weed, A War of Words between President Roosevelt and 
J. Pierpont Morgan concerning Railroads. Tariff and Trust Questions and the Panic of 1907 
(1907). 
3 3 N.Y. Times, August 11. 1907. pt. 2, at 6, col. 1. 
3 4 Quoted in Mowry, supra note 26, at 220-21 . Roosevelt 's biographer, Harbaugh, supra 
note 11, at 311, reports that " the President was subjected to heavy pressure from business 
to let u p , " especially after [Standard Oil] was fined S29 million in August for violating the 
Elkins Act. Harbaugh argues, however, that " t h e financial disturbances were caused by an 
international overextension of credit rather than by Roosevelt ' s p ronouncemen t s . " 
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In response to a request by J. P. Morgan's associates for postponement 
of the case to calm the financial waters, Attorney General Charles J. 
Bonaparte said on November 26 that "we can assent to no action which 
involves the admission that the course of the Administration in enforcing 
the Anti-Trust laws was, or is now, responsible for the existing financial 
complications." This sounded like " n o " but left the door open to a color-
able excuse. The federal prosecutor did in fact grant a postponement 
until January 6 on December 2, arguing that it was "good policy." Bona-
parte agreed and termed the suspension "very judicious." 3 5 
Compromise had been an option throughout 1907. 3 6 But by late fall 
matters became earnest. Roosevelt 's December 1907 message to Con-
gress recommended amendment of the Sherman Act " to forbid only the 
kind of combination which does harm to the general public." 3 7 Standard's 
offer to settle—rejected earlier—was entertained from April to July 1908. 
The brakes were also applied to antitrust generally. Only eight cases were 
filed in 1908, all in the first half of the year, compared to eleven in 1907, 
and none of the eight targets was a major industrial firm. Roosevelt di-
rected his attorney general not to sue International Harvester, and he 
approved U.S. Steel's merger with Tennessee Coal and Iron in the midst 
of the 1907 Panic. 3 8 Roosevelt 's willingness to modify the Sherman Act 
was made concrete in early 1908. The National Civic Federation in con-
sultation with the president and the commissioner of corporations drew 
up a statute, which was known as the Hepburn Bill, in order to permit 
" reasonable" restraints of trade. It would have allowed the Bureau of 
Corporations to approve industry agreements. 3 9 
D. Taft's Assault 
As president-elect, William Howard Taft had signaled a tough stance, 4 0 
but he filed only three cases during his first year in office. Only one case 
involved a " t rus t , " American Sugar. But a barrage of filings followed in 
3 5 Bringhurst , supra note 19, at 137-38. 
3 6 T h e N . Y . Times, January 25, 1907 at 1, col. 5, speculated that Roosevelt would attack 
only "bad"" trusts, apparently in response to private appeals to soften his attacks. 
3 7 Quo ted from Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruct ion of American Capitalism, 
1890-1916, at 216 (1988). 
3 8 See Pringle, supra note 11, at 445, on the first episode; and Harbaugh, supra note 11, 
at 314, on the second. The steel merger served as the basis for the 1911 U.S . Steel suit. 
3 9 A r thu r M. Johnson, Anti t rust Policy in Transition, 1908: Ideal and Reality, 47 Miss. 
Val ley Hist . Rev. 415 (1961); and Sklar, supra note 37, at 203-85, provide the background 
on the Hepburn Bill. It was introduced into the House on March 23. and Roosevelt endorsed 
it on March 25, 1908. but it was never passed. 
4 0 Paolo E. Coletta, The Presidency of William Howard Taft 154 (1973). See Table 1 for 
the D o w ' s reaction to his speech, delivered December 16, 1908. 
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1910 and 1911 under his attorney general, George Wickersham. By the 
end of his term in 1913, Taft had filed seventy-two cases in four years, 
compared to only forty-one filed by Roosevelt in seven. 
The policy was deliberate. 4 1 Taft outlined his views in October 1911: 
"We must get back to competition: If it is impossible, then let us go to 
socialism, for there is no way between." According to the Wall Street 
Journal, "[H]e said that he recognized the harm to business that such 
prosecuting would bring, but declared that prosecutions must go on . " 
Taft was quoted: "A reform of any evil is bound to produce for a time 
not disaster, we may hope, but difficult situations that may make business 
halt." 4 2 In another 1911 speech he said, "Every trust of any size that 
violates the statute will, before the end of this administration in 1913, be 
brought into court to meet and acquiesce in a degree of disintegration by 
which competition between its parts shall be restored and preserved ." 4 3 
Taft directed his December 1911 message to Congress at one issue: con-
trol of the trusts. 
When the National Civic Federation surveyed opinion on the trust 
question, 4 4 many business leaders blamed antitrust for poor business con-
ditions. 4 5 Wesley Clair Mitchell, who typically stressed monetary factors 
in business cycles, saw a connection between antitrust, the economy, 
and stock prices in 1911. 4 6 John Bates Clark and John Maurice Clark 
wrote, "[Breaking up too many corporations at once would be highly 
disturbing in the realm of business." 4 7 The Wall Street Journal wondered 
4 1 Wickersham predicted that one hundred corporat ions would be sued and corpora te 
officials sent to jail. Henry F . Pringle, Life of and Times of William Howard Taft 669 (1939); 
also N.Y. Times, September 23, 1911, at 2, col. 2; N . Y . Times, September 24, 1911, at 1, 
col. 7. 
4 2 Wall St. J., October 7, 1911, at 1, col. 4. See also Mowry, supra note 26, at 286. 
4 3 Pringle, supra note 41, at 669. 
4 4 National Civic Federation. The Trust Problem: Replies of 16,000 Representa t ive 
Americans to a Questionnaire (1912). Some economists , notably Frank Taussig, thought 
the trusts might have to be regulated. Id. at 361-62. John Bates Clark & John Maurice 
Clark. The Control of the Trusts 135 (1912). argued that federal price control would put " a 
damper on inventive genius ." 
4 5 National Civic Federation, supra note 44. To the question, " I n your judgment what 
caused or causes the present disturbed business condi t ions?" the president of L a c k a w a n a 
Steel answered: "lack of certainty as to what is o r is not legal under the Sherman L a w " ; 
the president of Lane Cotton Mills: "prosecut ion , or rather persecution, of large business 
organizations"; the president of Oliver Iron Mining: "uncer ta in ty as to the exact meaning 
of the Sherman Law; the apparent unfavorable attitude of government officials towards 
large corporat ions" (id. at 7-11). 
4 6 Mitchell, supra note 1, at 85. Quoted and discussed at text at note 64 infra. 
4 7 Clark & Clark, supra note 44, at 3. 
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why Taft, who had received a strong vote of confidence from business in 
the 1908 election, should try to destroy the prosperity of the country. 4 8 
But Taft held firm: "We are going to enforce that law or die in the at-
t empt . " 4 9 He did develop doubts. In January 1912, he asked his attorney 
general whether it was necessary to file both criminal and civil charges 
against United Shoe Machinery. 5 0 After hearing rumors that criminal 
charges would be filed in the steel suit, he told his attorney general in 
February that "I should like to be consulted before action of that sort is 
t aken . " 5 1 
The case against U.S. Steel, filed October 27, 1911, came after House 
hearings earlier that year. Roosevelt testified in August and defended his 
approval of the merger with Tennessee Coal and Iron during the 1907 
panic. Still, he was named in the suit, along with a "Who's Who" of 
American capitalists (Morgan, Rockefeller, Carnegie, Gary, and Frick, 
for example) . 5 2 International Harvester, filed April 30, 1912, was turned 
into a second jab at Roosevelt, who was accused of tolerating the "farm 
machinery t rus t . " 5 3 
The Supreme Court decisions in Standard Oil and American Tobacco 
were also major antitrust developments. The cases, decided May 15 and 
May 29, 1911, both showed that case outcomes were ambiguous. The 
government " w o n " these cases, but the divestitures were criticized. 5 4 In 
4 8 Wall St. J . , October 11, 1911 at 1, col . 3. Coletta, supra note 40, at 163: " I t was also 
said that business would no longer support Taft and the Republican party would instead 
turn to Judson Harmon in 1912 as the "most construct ive ' . . . of the Democratic hopefuls." 
4 9 L e t t e r dated November 5, 1911, quoted in Donald F. Anderson, William Howard Taft: 
A Conse rva t ive ' s Conception of the Presidency 81 (1968). 
5 0 Pringle, supra note 41 , at 669-70. 
5 1 Quo ted in Anderson, supra note 49, at 81. 
5 2 Taf t ' s special prosecutor had prepared the suit in secrecy " t o prevent possible specula-
tion in steel secur i t i es . " Pringle, supra note 4 1 , at 671. Still, the case was not a surprise. 
T w o w e e k s earlier, the Wall St. J . , October 10, 1911, at 1, col. 3, ran a story about " a 
group of b roker s gathered around the ticker . . . discussing United States Steel, the Sherman 
law and the probability of the Steel Trust being d issolved." 
5 3 Cole t ta , supra note 40, at 161. Roosevel t ' s approach to trusts is typically viewed as a 
major factor leading to his "Bull M o o s e , " Progressive candidacy, which made the 1912 
president ia l election a three-way race be tween Roosevelt , Taft, and the Democrat Wilson. 
Oddly enough , the " t rus t -bus t ing" Roosevelt was the probusiness candidate. He differenti-
ated be tween " g o o d " and " b a d " t rus ts , an approach both of his opponents rejected. 
5 4 Seage r & Gulick, supra note 9, at 123 and 177-78, quoting Louis Brandeis in December 
1911: " t h e decision of the U .S . Circuit approving the plan submitted by the American 
T o b a c c o C o m p a n y is in effect a nullification not only of the Sherman Law, but of the 
decis ion of the Supreme Court of the United S t a t e s . " Burns, supra note 22, provides 
statist ical suppor t for the view that the dissolution decrees were a pleasant surprise for 
s tockho lders . 
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addition, the "rule of reason" developed by the court was probably on 
the mild side of possible interpretations of the Sherman Act . 5 5 In fact, 
Congress ultimately reversed the Supreme Court when it passed the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and Clayton Acts . 5 6 The Dow actually increased 
2.3 percent following the Standard Oil decision and dropped slightly after 
the Tobacco decision. 
E. Wilson's First Two Years 
Woodrow Wilson continued Taft's policy of aggressive filings.5 7 The 
pressure for antitrust reform also mounted. Wilson's policies were 
heavily influenced by Louis Brandeis, a bitter foe of big business and a 
skilled propagandist. Still, Wilson seemed to fear the possible link be-
tween antitrust and the economy. A tough trust policy had been one of 
Wilson's campaign promises, but he struck a conciliatory pose: "The 
antagonism between business and government is over," he told Congress 
in January 1914.58 His advisers had in fact urged him to postpone new 
antitrust legislation because of the recession. 5 9 This first phase of U.S. 
antitrust ended in the fall of 1914, when Congress passed and Wilson 
signed the Clayton and FTC Acts. 6 0 
F. Summary 
The broad terms of the Sherman Act can support strict or lax antitrust, 
depending on enforcement and interpretation. By 1901 its main achieve-
5 5 But one Supreme Court Justice would probably have preferred to let the defendants off: 
Oliver Wendell Holmes. He thought the Sherman Act was " a humbug based on economic 
ignorance and incompetence" (quoted in Letwin, supra note 2, at 53), and he dissented 
vigorously in Northern Securities. 
5 6 See Seager & Gulick. supra note 9. at ch. 20: Letwin. supra note 2, at 265-70; and 
Jenks & Clark, supra note 17, at 231-34, on the trail that leads from the 1911 decisions to 
the 1914 legislation. Other decisions also played a role: Minnesota v. Northern Securities 
194 U.S. 48 (1904). held that a state cannot sue for an injunction under the Sherman Act. 
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.. 244 U.S. 1 (1912). held that a patentee selling a patented article 
may restrict its use to unpatented supplies sold by the patentee. The Clayton Act allowed 
states to seek injunctions, and it prohibited tying. 
5 7 Over the next two years, suits were filed against American Telephone and Telegraph, 
American Can. United Shoe, Burroughs Adding Machine, Eastman Kodak, and Corn Prod-
ucts, for example. 
5 8 Quoted in Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams , Louis 
D. Brandeis. James M. Landis. Alfred E. Kahn 118 (1984). 
5 9 August Heckscher. Woodrow Wilson 324 (1991). 
6 0 "Everyone understood that if Wilson were regarded as antibusiness during a period of 
economic downturn, then the Democratic party would suffer in the off-year elections of 
1914. This was one reason why Congress balked at voting adequate appropriat ions for the 
new F T C . " McCraw, supra note 58, at 126. 
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ment was to drive many firms away from loose cooperative arrangements 
and toward merger and the holding company. Roosevelt revived the law 
and undertook sporadic, politically motivated attacks on many of the 
newly formed or expanded corporations. In the face of charges that his 
policies hurt business confidence, he was willing in 1904 and again in late 
1907 to early 1908 to cut back enforcement and even propose a new 
law that would be friendlier to business. Taft's policy, in contrast, was 
stubborn, perhaps even inept, in the face of similar criticism. Filings 
probably capture only a fraction of short-run policy swings by the presi-
dent and Congress, especially in 1907. The Supreme Court, while also 
important, often bowed to political pressure and sought compromise. 
Antitrust played an important role in several presidencies, it was inti-
mately wrapped up with the rise of the modern corporation and the "cor-
poration problem," and its evolution often seems to have been governed 
by chance or political factors. 6 1 
II. CASE FILINGS, ANTITRUST, AND STOCK PRICES 
A. Federal Case Filings 
All told, the Department of Justice filed 127 antitrust cases from Janu-
ary 1904 through July 1914, but they were only the tip of the antitrust 
iceberg. Clearly, Congress, the president, and the courts did a lot more 
than file cases. In addition, states and private parties filed suits. 6 2 Still, 
federal filings have some virtues. They are relatively homogeneous, and 
their filing dates are easily established. Filing a suit is clearly an enforce-
ment action, and in the end only enforcement matters. Other federal 
activities—hearings and votes in Congress, presidential pronouncements, 
the establishment of new agencies, and court decisions—are important, 
but the construction of useful measures would be tricky. Each federal 
case does imply more litigation than meets the eye. In some cases, the 
Justice Department moved against corporations already under attack by 
other government agencies or in state or private suits. Standard Oil is the 
6 1 1 have ignored the mer i ts of the cases . See John S. McGee , Predatory Pricing Cutting: 
The S tandard Oil (N.J . ) Case , 1 J. Law & Econ . 137 (1958); Kenneth G. Elzinga, Predatory 
Pricing: T h e Case of the G u n p o w d e r Trus t , 13 J. Law & Econ. 223 (1970); David Reiffen 
& A n d r e w N . Klei t . Terminal Railroad Revisi ted: Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or 
Simple Hor izonta l Monopo ly? 33 J. Law & Econ . 409 (1990). 
6 2 Michael A. Duggan, Anti t rust and the Supreme Cour t , 1929-1971 (1972), lists seventy-
one ant i t rust cases decided by the Supreme Court after the 1895 E. C. Knight decision and 
before passage of the Clayton and FTC Acts in 1914. The government filed only twenty-
three of t hese , less than one-third. 
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leading example. In other cases federal filings provoked private or state 
piggyback suits. 6 3 
Federal filings are special in other ways. First, the government exer-
cises prosecutorial discretion. The hundred-year history of antitrust is 
replete with examples. Second, case filings reflect a political reality to 
which the Supreme Court often defers. It is naive to think that the high 
court simply interprets the law. Third, the government can throw lawyers 
at a case that private plaintiffs would pass up. Winning a case in the end 
may not matter to a president who expects to be out of office in less 
than four or eight years. Finally, certain types of economically important 
filings, like the large-firm deconcentration case, are exclusively federal 
actions. 
From a statistical point of view, case filings are a count or Poisson-like 
variable with a fairly low mean (roughly a case per month), which implies 
that the value for a given month or even several months depends on 
underlying factors as well as random influences. For that reason and 
because all filings are not the same, they measure perceived enforcement 
with error. 
B. Stock-Market Effects 
How could antitrust have influenced stock prices? Many mechanisms 
are possible, but I will focus on three. One builds on Mitchell's analysis 
of the 1911 recession. The other two stem from the long debate on the 
monopoly problem and the rise of the modern corporation. Mitchell ar-
gued that trust prosecutions reduced orders in 1911 for new equipment 
in many industries. 
Fresh alarm "was caused in October by the bringing of a federal suit 
against the United States Steel Corporation. Throughout the year, in 
fact, enterprise on the part of large capitalists was materially checked by 
6 3 The discovery and testimony in a federal case undoubtedly lowered the cost of a 
follow-up suit. Cases related to federal suits include Chattanooga Pipe and Foundry v. City 
of Atlanta 203 U.S. (1906) 390 (based on Addyston), International Harves ter v. Missouri 233 
U.S. 389 (1914). Minnesota v. Northern Securities 194 U .S . (1904). Harr iman v. Nor the rn 
Securities 197 U.S. 244 (1905). A purchaser from Corn Products claimed no obligation to 
pay for products bought from an antitrust violator: Wilder Manufacturing C o . v. Corn 
Products Refining Co. 236 U.S . 165 (1915). See also Buckeye Powder Co. v. DuPont Powder 
Co. 248 U.S . 55 (1918). In other cases, private action preceded the related federal suit. 
Hartman v. John D. Park and Sons 145 F. 358 (E .D. Ky. 1906) rev 'd 153 F. 24 (6th. Cir. 
1907), cert, dismissed 212 U.S . 588(1908). stimulated the filing of U .S . v. National Associa-
tion of Retail Druggists in May of 1906. These cases challenged the "'direct con t rac t ' 1 sys tem 
of maintaining resale prices for drug wholesalers and retailers. See Joseph E. For tenber ry , 
A History of the Antitrust Law of Vertical Pract ices , 11 Res. L. & Econ. 133 (1988). 
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uncertainty regarding the legal position of business combinations. Hence 
all the trades that depend upon the volume of new construction put under 
contract found 1911a dull year. Finance, of course, reflected this dullness 
in exaggerated fashion." 6 4 
Let us take Mitchell's focus on uncertainty at face value but drop his 
view that the stock market overreacts . 6 5 He assumes no efficiency and no 
monopoly effects from merger, the holding company, and other disputed 
practices. Mere uncertainty causes stock prices to fall because business 
plans are on hold, and investment industries are especially hard hit. In 
the context here, federal lawsuits may be a proxy for uncertainty. Uncer-
tainty aside, stocks of prospective defendants also should decline by the 
expected cost of defending the suit. Finally, defendants and potential 
defendants—all " t r u s t s " and other news forms of business—also stood 
to lose organization-specific quasi rents, even if those firms were per-
fectly innocent of monopoly but not particularly efficient. 
The uncertainty scenario begs a question: where did the trust and cor-
poration problem come from? A spectrum of related " t rus t" forms arose 
in the late nineteenth century: the bona fide trusts, cartels, pools, holding 
companies, mergers, and interlocking directorates. It makes sense to 
view these as related devices, with the choice governed by the circum-
stances of a given industry, the changing technology of cooperative 
forms, and the volatile legal framework. By one time-honored hypothesis, 
the trusts were monopolies. 6 6 Another venerated tradition emphasizes 
revolutions in transportation, production, distribution, and communica-
tion and the efficiency of the "visible hand" in some settings. 6 7 
Suppose textbook monopolies exist, and textbook antitrust cases are 
Mitchell, supra note 46. Mitchell did not mention the trust question in his discussion 
of the 1907 panic, al though the idea of a link was widespread at the time. 
6 5 Mitchell 's invocation of ' "uncer ta in ty" may simply have echoed the complaints by 
bus iness leaders, found in note 45 supra. 
6 6 Thorell i , supra note 2. George J. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 Am. 
E c o n . Rev. (1950), repr inted in Stigler, The Organization of Industry (1968), examines the 
choice between two monopoly forms, cartel and merger. 
6 / Alfred Chandler , The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(1977). Turn-of-the-century economis ts often viewed cartels as a defense against cutthroat 
compet i t ion . More recent generat ions have dismissed the idea, but Telser 's work on the 
core has put the notion of the infeasibility of competit ive outcomes on firm theoretical 
footing. Lester G. Telser . Economic Theory and the Core (1978). Telser, supra note 2, 
gives an account of the rise of the trusts that emphasizes the obstacles that fixed costs place 
in the way of purely compet i t ive ou tcomes . Naomi Lamoreux . The Great Merger Movement 
in Amer ican Capitalism, 1895-1904 (1985); and Bittlingmayer, supra note 6, also emphasize 
fixed costs in the search for cooperat ive forms at the turn of the century. 
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then filed. The value of monopolies as well as the value of any free-riding 
competitive fringe should fall. The extent of the fall will depend on 
(1) the likelihood of a successful legal action, (2) the extent of monopoly 
rents at stake, and (3) the extent of monopoly in the economy since the 
suppression of widespread monopoly would increase aggregate demand, 
even for monopolies. 6 8 Firms in competitive industries should be worth 
more, especially those buying from monopolies or selling to monopso-
nists. The effect on a broad stock index could be positive, negative, or 
zero, depending on the prevalence of monopoly among traded firms and 
in the economy as a whole. 
Suppose instead that the trusts—broadly defined—promoted effi-
ciency. A serious application of the Sherman Act would have eliminated 
the holding company and all merger activity. All firms that had made 
acquisitions during the merger wave of 1898-1902 were at risk. A finding 
of predation, for example, subjected firms to dismemberment. Arguably, 
the fate of the modern corporation was at stake. 6 9 Branded goods, patent 
licensing, and new methods of distribution were also under attack. Sup-
pose these forms promoted efficiency. Filings should lower stock prices 
of defendants, likely defendants, and firms forced to change their busi-
ness plans. Businesses that stood little chance of being sued would also 
suffer from an attack on efficient forms. 7 0 
These three mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Antitrust enforce-
ment may have made the legal status of corporations uncertain, it may 
have attacked classic monopolies, and it may may have attacked efficient 
forms of organization, all at the same time. 
C. The Data 
Table 2 lists the stock indexes used here and gives the number of firms 
in each index in January 1904 and July 1914 as well as the number of 
cases filed against firms in each index over that period. The Cowles series 
are value-weighted indexes based on all stocks traded on the New York 
6 8 James M. Buchanan & Dwight R. Lee, Private Interest Support for Efficiency Enhanc-
ing Antitrust Policies, 30 Econ. Inq. 218 (1992). relies on this point to generate a world in 
which organized private interests support the suppression of monopolies, including their 
own. 
6 9 Sklar. supra note 37, at 179: " T h e trust question was the corporation quest ion. The 
great antitrust debates . . . were in essence , debates about the role and power of large 
corporations in the market and society at l a rge . " 
7 0 By the available evidence, antitrust was directed at new efficient forms. See Di-
Lorenzo, supra note 3; and Telser, supra note 2, at ch. 2. 
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T A B L E 2 
NUMBER OF STOCKS IN SELECTED INDEXES. 1 9 0 4 AND 1 9 1 4 , AND NUMBER OF CASES FILED 
AGAINST FIRMS IN T H O S E INDEXES, 1 9 0 4 - 1 4 
NUMBER OF STOCKS IN INDEX V , 
NUMBER 
January 1 9 0 4 July 1 9 1 4 OF CASES 
Cowles indexes: 
All-stock index 119 162 24 
Industrials* 62 103 12 
Railroads 45 44 l i t 
1 Utilities 12 15 
Miscellaneous services 8 9 0 
Mining and smelting 5 10 0 
Steel (without U . S . Steel) 6 7 0 
Miscellaneous manufactur ing 10 11 1 
Dow indexes: 
Industrials 12 12 4 
Railroads 20 20 8t 
Total cases filed, 1904-14$ 127 
Note.—The 1913 American Telephone and Telegraph case was the one case against a Cowles utility, 
and the 1913 American Can case was the one case against a Cowles "miscellaneous manufacturing" 
firm. 
* The Cowles "industrials" index includes all stocks except railroads and utilities. 
* Includes both Terminal Railroad cases (which involved multiple defendants), two cases each against 
the Reading and the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroads, and the filing against Union Pacific 
Coal. 
4 Total cases filed excludes the three labor cases, one filed in 1908 and two in 1911, and it excludes 
U.S. v. One Hundred and Seventy-Five Cases of Cigarettes (1 D. & J. 717), filed in 1907. Cases filed 
on the same day and involving the same industry or same defendants were counted as one case. 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) . 7 1 Remarkably, many leading antitrust defen-
dants are not part of the Cowles index before 1915. 7 2 
I use the Cowles all-stock index and its three components: industrials, 
railroads, and utilities. Of 127 cases filed, only twelve involved a Cowles 
industrial firm; eleven, a Cowles railroad; and one, a Cowles utility. In 
addition, I use those Cowles series with at least five stocks as of January 
7 1 Alfred Cowles III and Assoc ia tes , Common-Stock Indexes (1939). These series include 
all s tocks t raded on the N e w Stock Exchange and are based on the average of the monthly 
high and low, which induces some autocorrelat ion of returns . I use the series without 
dividends to facilitate compar ison with the Dow, which also excludes dividends. The Dow 
indexes a re end-of-month values from The Dow Jones Averages , 1885-1980 (Phyllis Pierce 
ed. 1982). 
7 2 S tandard Oil, American T o b a c c o , and Otis Elevator were traded on the curb market 
in 1907. O the r defendants from this era were not included in the Cowles series until much 
later: Kodak (1920), DuPont (1922), Cudahy Packing, Armour (1925). Aluminum Company 
of Amer ica . Nat ional Cash Regis ter , Quake r Oats , Burroughs Adding Machine, and Swift 
(1926). 
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1904 but no more than one case filing over the sample period— 
miscellaneous services, mining and smelting, iron and steel (excluding 
U.S. Steel), and miscellaneous manufacturers. 7 3 Stock-price movements 
in these indexes should reflect only the general effect of case filings for 
potential defendants, fringe firms, or firms facing no antitrust threat, not 
the threat to defendant firms. The data for the Dow indexes are also 
shown. All firms in the Dow were also in the Cowles index. 
Notice that NYSE-listed railroads were actually more likely to be the 
target of a suit than NYSE industrial firms. This probably overstates the 
relative importance of antitrust for the railroad index. The handful of 
large, listed industrial defendants (U.S. Steel, International Harvester, 
American Sugar Refining, General Electric, Corn Products, American 
Can ranked 1, 5, 6, 15, 16, and 19, respectively, among the top fifty 
industrials in size of assets in 1908) and large, listed potential defendants 
probably figured heavily in the value-weighted industrial index. Railroads 
also came under a different although related regulatory regime with the 
Hepburn Act of 1906 (not to be confused with the 1908 Hepburn Bill) 
and the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910. The iron and steel series, which ex-
cludes U.S. Steel, provides a particular illustration of how actual enforce-
ment was a poor proxy for the likely threat from Justice Department 
lawyers. No firm in that index was sued, but the Sherman Act was ripe 
with potential. Bethlehem Steel, Republic Steel, and U.S. Pipe and 
Foundry (the Addyston defendants), for example, were all the products 
of merger. 
I I I . THE DOW-JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE AND ANTITRUST CASE 
FILINGS, RESULTS BASED ON SIX- AND TWELVE-DAY PERIODS 
This section presents some estimates of the short-run effects of anti-
trust enforcement. The two variables are the case filings and the return 
on the Dow industrial average over six- and twelve-trading-day periods. 
I use the Dow because it is available on a daily basis. Of the twelve 
stocks in the index at any one time, four were involved in federal antitrust 
suits before 1914—U.S. Steel common and preferred, American Sugar 
common, and General Electric common. These constitute roughly 3 per-
cent of all case filings for this period. Since stocks were traded on Satur-
days until the late 1940s, six and twelve days correspond roughly to one 
and two weeks. 
7 3 Although railroad equipment should be included under this criterion, I left it out be-
cause it seemed likely to be heavily influenced by the fate of the railroads. Mitchell, supra 
note 46, at 85, reports that the February 1911 ICC refusal to allow railroad-rate increases 
reduced orders for equipment. 
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My aim is to see whether case filings lowered the Dow over short time 
periods. Since it takes at least several weeks to prepare an antitrust case, 
a finding of a significant short-term association would tip the balance in 
favor of finding that antitrust filings cause stock-price changes rather than 
the other way around. The estimated effect per case over this short period 
is also of interest. Since estimated coefficients from longer periods are 
clouded by the suspicion of endogeneity—past stock-price declines caus-
ing case filings—the short-term results are a skeptic's estimate of the 
effects of case filings. 
Let DOW(/, / - k) k = 6, 12, be the return on the Dow from the end 
of day / - k through the end of day t, and let CAS(r, t - k), k = 6, 12, 
equal the number of cases filed from the end of day t - k through the 
end of day Consider a formulation in the spirit of Granger "causality" 
or temporal association: do past returns and case filings predict current 
returns? The estimated model for six-day periods is specified as 
DOW(/, t - 6) = a + 6 0 DOW(/ - 6, t - 12) 
T (1) 
+ V 6,CAS(, - 6i, t - 6(i + 1)) + v M _ 6 - 6, 
i= i 
with T = 3 and 6. Regressions for twelve-day periods are defined analo-
gously. Only one lag of Dow returns is included because of the well-
known result that stock returns follow a near-random walk. The one lag 
here merely confirms that fact. Can we, however, reject the hypothesis 
that the b-x are jointly equal to zero? 
My estimates and exclusion tests for (1) appear in Table 3. I also in-
clude current case filings in an alternate specification. Neither past re-
turns nor past case filings influence current returns, but the coefficient 
on CAS(/, / - 6) (concurrent returns) indicates that a case depresses 
DOW in the same six-day period by .423 (t = 2.27) to .444 percent (t = 
2.37). The rejection of the null hypothesis for lagged effects would be 
surprising since it would imply that an observable variable Granger 
causes stock returns. The estimated effect over concurrent twelve-day 
periods is slightly lower and has a substantially higher standard error. 
If case filings are anticipated on average, a different approach is in 
order. The top set of results in Table 4 show regressions of six- and 
twelve-day Dow returns on the number of cases over leading periods 
(end of day t to end of day / + 24) and over the lagging/concurrent 
periods (end of day t - 24 through the end of day t).74 These results 
7 4 On the use of explanatory variables defined over periods greater than the sampling 
interval, see Robert J. Hoder ick , Dividend Yields and Expected Stock Returns: Alternative 
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T A B L E 3 
REGRESSIONS OF SIX- AND TWELVE-DAY RETURNS ON LAGGED RETURNS AND LAGGED CASE 
FILINGS, JANUARY 1 9 0 4 - J U L Y 1 9 1 4 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SE(/>,) SE(Z>,) b, SE(bi) bi SE(b, 
. Six-day returns: 
DOW(/, / - 6): 
Constant .45 .12 1.11 1.27 .33 .14 1.04 1.41 
DOW(/ - 6. / - 12) .03 .04 .02 .04 .03 .04 .02 .04 
CASU, r - 6) - 4 . 2 3 1.86 - 4 . 4 4 1.87 
CAS(/ - 6, t - 12) - . 0 8 1.86 .14 1.86 .07 1.88 .32 1.87 
CAS(/ - 12, / - 18) - . 9 7 1.82 - . 1 9 1.85 - . 6 1 1.88 .26 1.90 
CAS(/ - 18. t - 24) 3.08 1.85 3.54 1.85 3.28 1.90 3.82 1.91 
CAS(/ - 24. t - 30) - 1.43 1.92 - 1.64 1.92 
CASU - 30. t - 36) - 1.13 1.91 - 1.28 1.90 
CAS(/ - 36. t - 42) .66 1.87 .53 1.87 
CAS(/ - 42, / - 48) 1.68 1.87 2.00 1.87 
R2 .01 .02 .01 .02 
Exclusion test* .39 .09 .72 .26 
. Twelve-day returns: 
DOW(f, t - 12): 
Constant 1.90 2.44 3.20 .26 1.39 2.74 2.67 .29 
DOW(/ - 12, t - 24) .04 .06 .02 .06 .04 .06 .02 .06 
CAS(/, / - 12) - 3 . 6 7 2.50 - 3 . 6 4 2.52 
CAS(/ - 12, / - 24) .25 2.40 1.22 2.48 - . 0 8 2.51 .96 2.60 
CAS(/ - 24, t - 36) 1.15 2.60 .86 2.60 
CAS(/ - 36, / - 48) .28 2.50 .51 .25 
R: .00 .01 .00 .01 
Exclusion test* .92 .34 .97 .67 
NOTE.—Coefficients and standard errors for the constant and for the CAS variables have been multi-
pled by 1,000. Consequently, the CAS coefficients give the per-case effect in tenths of a percent. Durbin-
Watson statistics for these regressions fell in the range [1.97. 2.00] and the Ljung-Box test indicated no 
general serial correlation of the error term. Estimates for six-day case filings are based on 520 observa-
tions; those for twelve-day filings on 260. 
* Significance level of the F-test for the hypothesis that the coefficients of the CAS variables are zero. 
show dramatically that future cases are associated with negative current 
returns. Current and past cases have little if any influence. The results in 
the lower half of Table 4 show that this also holds if cases from the next 
forty-eight days are used, but the estimated standard errors are larger. 
The per-case effect can be obtained by multiplying the estimated coeffi-
cient by the number of sample intervals in twenty-four or forty-eight 
days. For six-day returns, each case filed results in a .732 percent decline 
in the Dow over the period t + 24 to / - 24. The coefficients measure 
Procedures for Inference and Measurement (unpublished manuscript , Kellog Graduate 
School Mgmt.. Northwestern Univ., June 4. 1990). 
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T A B L E 4 
REGRESSIONS OF SIX- AND T W E L V E - D A Y RETURNS ON CASE FILINGS SUMMED OVER LEADING 
AND LAGGING PERIODS L O N G E R THAN THE SAMPLING INTERVAL, JANUARY 1 9 0 4 - J U L Y 1 9 1 4 
6 -DAY RETURNS: 12-DAY RETURNS: 
D O W ( / , t - 6) D O W U . i - 12) 
b, SEO,) b, SEO,) 
Constant 2.68 1.40 6.07 2.82 
CAS(? + 24, /) - 1.97 .77 - 3 . 3 6 1.49 
CAS(f, / - 24) .14 .77 - .86 1.49 
R2 .01 .02 
D - W 1.95 1.97 
Constant 2.78 1.57 5.99 3.16 
CAS(/ + 48 , /) - 1.29 .51 - 2 . 4 1 1.02 
CAS(r, t - 48) .34 .51 .37 1.01 
R2 .01 .02 
D - W 1.96 1.96 
NOTE.—Coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 1,000. Consequently, the coefficients 
show in tenths of a percent the effect on stock prices in a given six- or twelve-day period per case filed 
over twenty-four or forty-eight days. 
the decline in tenths of a percent, hence in tenths, we have 7.32 = ( -1 .97 
+ .14) x 4. 
I V . MONTHLY STOCK PRICES, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 
AND CASE FILINGS 
I now turn to an examination of monthly data, which allows me to look 
at a variety of Cowles indexes and not just the Dow. Moreover, the 
Babson index of industrial production is also available monthly, giving 
me an explanatory variable that reflects factors not reflected by case 
filings.75 Finally, monthly data permit fairly parsimonious estimates of 
the effects over horizons extending several months. 
I will now change notation slightly, partly to emphasize that I am deal-
ing with different data. Define the following variables: 
RET, = percentage change in one of the stock indexes in Table 2 
from month / — 1 to month t, 
CAS, - number of federal antitrust cases filed in month t. 
7 5 The Babson index is from 2 Bus . Cycle Indicators 130, table 15.1 (Geoffrey H. Moore 
ed . 1961). It is based on physical product ion in manufactures , mining, agriculture, construc-
t ion, rai l road t ranspor ta t ion , electricity generat ion, and foreign trade, with the weights 
based on value added. 
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My regressions in Table 5 follow the form 
T 
RET, - a + /?,CAS, + / + e„ (2) 
with T = 6 for the ten different stock price indexes. Broadly speaking, 
each case per month is associated with a 1-3 percent decline of the 
various indexes. This decline is more pronounced in 1904-8, where the 
all stock index drops 2.80 percent and runs between 1.75 percent (miscel-
laneous manufacturing) and 6.53 (steel excluding U.S. Steel). It falls 
somewhat for 1909-14 to 1.01 for the all-stock index and runs between 
.69 (utilities) and 2.10 (steel excluding U.S. Steel). Note that, for 1904-14 
as a whole, thirty-seven out of forty coefficients for leads 3-6 are nega-
tive, but only two-thirds (twenty-one out of thirty coefficients) are nega-
tive for leads 0 - 2 . Finally, all cumulative coefficients are negative. 
Consider the industry effects. Although only one case was filed against 
the firms in the four industrial indexes (miscellaneous service, mining and 
smelting, iron and steel, and miscellaneous manufacturing), each experi-
enced declines of .92-6.53 percent per case, depending on the industry 
and period. These cumulative coefficients are typically two to three times 
as large as the estimated standard error. The utilities also declined sharply 
in 1904-8, although the only utility suit was filed in 1913. Both results 
support the idea that the actual pattern of enforcement provides only a 
rough guide to the particular firms and industries at risk. The strong 
negative effects for iron and steel supports either the idea that the fringe 
steel firms benefited from the U.S. Steel's high prices or that they were 
also likely targets of attack. The consistent negative effects in the two 
diversified groups (miscellaneous services and miscellaneous manufactur-
ing), however, seems to suggest that these firms were themselves likely 
targets. The decline in railroads was about two-thirds as large as the 
decline in industrials for 1904-8 but only half as great for 1909-14, which 
is consistent with the declining importance of antitrust for railroads. 
The relation of the /-statistics for the sums of the case coefficients and 
the F-statistics for the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal 
to zero deserves comment. Figure 2 provides the t- and F-statistics for 
equation (2) using the Cowles all-industry return with values of T = 
0, . . . , 8. Clearly, the /-statistic rejects the hypothesis of zero effects 
for long and short distributed leads. The F-statistic falls off rapidly, how-
ever, and rejects the null decisively only for the first few values of T. My 
inclination has been to set T = 6 because the historical and institutional 
evidence suggests leakages as far as six months in advance of a case 
filing and because the inherent errors-in-variables problem is mitigated by 
looking over longer periods. 
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Figure. 2.—F- and ^-statistics for RET, = a + Sf = 0 6,CAS,_, + <?,, 7 = 0 8. with 
RET, based on the all-industry Cowles index. 
The estimates in Table 5 are not driven by the cases filed against firms 
in the index. I get nearly identical results when 1 use only cases against 
firms not in the Cowles index. They are also not driven by spikes in the 
case filings series. Unreported regressions using a dummy variable based 
on CAS, > 0 yield essentially similar results. Table 5 results are also not 
driven by the Panic of 1907, although that year was different. A binary 
variable equal to one for January-December 1907 yields a coefficient of 
-4.13 percent (SE = .89 percent) and a summed case effect of - 1.36 
percent (SE = .36 percent) for the all-industry Cowles regression. Re-
gressions based on the other indexes provide similar results. Estimates 
restricted to 1904-8 yield a coefficient of -4 .29 percent for the 1907 
months, per-case effects roughly half as large as in the middle panel of 
Table 5, and slightly lower standard errors. 
What was special about 1907? Aspects of antitrust not reflected in 
filings data provide some possible answers. The government pursued 
Standard Oil aggressively for most of the year, it raised the possibility of 
criminal charges, it sought to put antitrust defendants in receivership, 
Roosevelt worked the trust question politically, and at least one major 
case was planned and then abandoned. Traditional accounts of the Panic 
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of 1907 emphasize troubles in the banking sector, but those troubles oc-
curred in October and November, well after most of the stock decline. 
Bank panics may themselves be symptoms rather than causes. 
A further test of the robustness can be obtained by including current 
and future values of industrial production. 7 6 Table 6 has regressions of 
the form 
where CHPRD, is the percentage change in Babson's industrial produc-
tion series. This specification is an atheoretical way of controlling for 
other factors that may influence stock prices. These other factors, dis-
tilled in measured production, may be conventional monetary and fiscal 
policy, or they may be other varieties of business policy, including the 
struggle over the trust question. 
The summed coefficients for industrial production typically take on 
values of one to two, with higher values prevalent for cyclical stocks 
(industrials, mining and smelting, and iron and steel). These estimates 
are consistent with results from previous studies, which regard stock 
prices as reflecting levels of expected future production. 7 7 A 1 percent 
decline in industrial production lowers stock prices about 1 percent. The 
cumulative case filing coefficients are still uniformly negative and statisti-
cally significant in most instances. Note, however, that they are smaller 
for 1904-8 than in Table 5 but not for 1909-14. Consequently, the cumula-
tive effects are still two to three times as large as the estimated standard 
errors for the period as a whole and for 1909-14 but not for 1904-8. The 
F-statistics for the hypothesis that the joint effect of the case variables is 
zero drop slightly for railroads and utilities in 1904-8 and drop substan-
tially for industrials. They increase somewhat for 1909-14, however. The 
significance levels often fall short of conventional standards, but this is 
largely a consequence of the number of leads used. I could have gener-
ated higher F-statistics by a judicious choice of leads. 
Tables 5 and 6 show uniformly negative effects of filings on stock prices 
of individual industries. This holds for various specifications, for indus-
tries with no antitrust defendants, and for both subperiods. The absence 
7 6 The use of future values of industrial production to explain stock-price variation is 
defended in Eugene F . Fama , Stock Returns , Expected Returns and Real Activity, 45 J. 
Fin. 1089 (1990); and G. William Schwert , Stock Returns and Real Activity: A Century of 
E v i d e n c e , 45 J. Fin. 1237 (1990). 
7 7 Fama , supra note 76; and Schwert , supra note 76. 
6 6 
(3) 
i = 1 i= 1 
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of positive industry effects supports Mitchell's uncertainty mechanism, 
it supports the hypothesis that publicly traded firms were typically mo-
nopolies, and it supports the view that the target corporations promoted 
efficiency. It fails to support the view that antitrust created winners as 
well as losers among identifiable groups of publicly traded firms by, say, 
eliminating efficiency-reducing monopolies. 7 8 
The long-term effects of antitrust on stock prices are also of interest, 
but a reliable estimate would require long-term data. Some back-of-the-
envelope calculations are instructive. Compare August 1901, that is, just 
before McKinley's assassination and after five years of unprecedented 
expansion, with August 1909, when it seemed that the Republicans had 
accommodated themselves to scaled-back enforcement and compromise 
on the trust question. Only two cases were filed between June 1908 and 
December 1909. 7 9 The Dow Industrials (excluding dividends) increased 
at 4.2 percent per year over those eight years, and the Cowles industrial 
index (including dividends) increased at 12.0 percent. This is one guess 
of the net effects of a regime of steady, scaled-back enforcement. Of 
course, the antitrust genie was not entirely back in the bottle in 1909, 
and the Panic of 1907 may have had some lasting repercussions. 
Conversely, stock prices over the period 1909-14, during the Taft and 
early Wilson administrations, provide the best guess of the effects of a 
sustained shift to vigorous enforcement. I will use the June values for 
both 1909 and 1914 to avoid any contamination by the July-August 1914 
political crisis in Europe. The Dow dropped 2.5 percent per year, the 
Cowles increased by 5.3 percent per year. The net decrease in the rate 
of growth from 1901-9 to 1909-14 was 6.7 percentage points for both 
stock indexes. So, that drop represents a tentative estimate of the net 
effect of a permanent shift in antitrust regimes on the level of stock prices. 
They were 33.5 ( = 6.7 x 5) percent lower. 
V . ANTITRUST'S EFFECTS ON THE STOCK PRICES OF DEFENDANT FIRMS 
This section looks at effects of antitrust case filings on the stock prices 
of individual defendant firms. If the stock prices of actual targets of fed-
Should not the case-filings variable be unexpected case filings? In principle, yes. But 
the construct ion of a measure of unexpected filings typically involves subracting an average 
of past filings from current filings. In 1904-14, antitrust was new and shifted quickly, so 
that subtracting an average of past filings—say the predicted value of an autoregression— 
leaves the results largely unaffected or merely adds noise. In work covering later years, 
this strategy yields the expected results. George Bittlingmayer, Stock Returns, Real Activity 
and the Trust Quest ion, 47 J. Fin. 1701 (1992). 
7 9 The two were Allen Bros. (April 1909) and American Sugar Refining (July 1909). 
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eral actions dropped substantially more than the Dow, then the Dow's 
drop of 1-3 percent per case can be rationalized at least in part as the 
market's response to a higher perceived probability of future filings 
against individual firms. An event study can also throw light on the ques-
tion of whether filings were exogenous. If the stock prices of individual 
targets dropped at the same time as the Dow, roughly over the six months 
preceding a filing, then we have circumstantial evidence that the Dow's 
drop took place in anticipation of increased filings.80 
Of the firms sued by the government between January 1904 and July 
1914, eleven had stock traded continuously and reported in the Wall 
Street Journal from three years before the filing until one year after. Of 
these, eight also had traded preferred stock. Four stocks in the Dow— 
three common and one preferred—belonged to the eleven target firms, 
but this only biases the results against finding any firm-level effect. Table 
7 presents the results of a conventional event study in which the month 
of the filing is defined as month [0]. I use the Dow rather than the Cowles 
index because the Cowles is based on averages of monthly highs and 
lows rather than end-of-month values. 
Unusually large negative residual returns are clustered in months [ -4 , 
1]. The cumulative decline over those months for the common and pre-
ferred stocks taken together is -9 .34 percent. Common and preferred 
both drop roughly 10 percent over the year leading to the case filing, but 
common drops 11.32 and preferred 6.62 percent over months [ - 4 , 1]. 
The common stock of defendant firms also continues to decline more 
sharply after the filing, dropping another 11.1 percent over [1, 12], as 
compared to 2.02 percent for the preferred. 8 1 The fraction of positive 
residual returns is also particularly low in the months leading up to a 
filing. These results provide strong evidence that antitrust cases were 
anticipated over a period of several months on average, which is consis-
tent with the historical accounts for individual cases. They also yield 
per-firm effects nearly an order of magnitude greater than for the all-stock 
Cowles index. 
8 0 These results are also of independent interest. Burns, supra note 22. at 717, found that 
three antitrust suits filed in 1906 and 1907—snuff, tobacco, and oil—lowered common stock 
prices 6.3-16.1 percent in the months [0. 1]. My results are based on a broader sample that 
includes many filings after the Panic of 1907. 
8 1 Part of this difference is no doubt due to Standard Oil. which did not have traded 
preferred. The calculated beta for Standard is low, .10 for months [ - 3 5 , - 12] and .31 for 
[ - 3 5 . + 12], possibly reflecting the special factors influencing Standard 's fortunes. As a 
result, Standard's decline over November 1905-November 1907 of 41 percent is attributed 
largely to idiosyncratic rather than " m a r k e t " factors. Standard 's " id iosyncra t ic" drop of 
11 percent in November 1907, a year after the filing, also contributes substantially to the 
large negative return for month [12] in the results. 
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VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Franklin Fisher faults the Handbook of Industrial Organization for its 
neglect of antitrust policy. Indeed, he argued that recent theory provides 
little if any illumination in actual cases. 8 2 But I think we can go further. 
Industrial economics should take its cue from monetary economics, 
where speculation about policy is informed by knowledge of monetary 
institutions and estimates of the effects of policy in the past. We should 
know as much about antitrust under Roosevelt, Taft, and Thurman Ar-
nold (Franklin Roosevelt 's antitrust chief) as monetary economists know 
about free silver or Federal Reserve policy in the 1930s. 
I have looked at the stock-market reaction to antitrust case filings dur-
ing the trust-busting era. Broad indexes declined 1-3 percent in advance 
of filings, and industry indexes with no antitrust filings declined as much 
as 10 percent. The basic result holds for two subperiods, 1904-8 and 
1909-14, and it holds using future industrial production as an extra ex-
planatory variable. The common and preferred stocks of firms actually 
filed against declined substantially more than the Dow in the months 
leading up to the filing. Three explanatory mechanisms are possible. 
If we go with Mitchell and emphasize uncertainty, trust-busting may 
have had no effect on efficiency in the long run but reduced production 
and investment over the short run and hence stock prices. Quasi rents to 
existing organizations also fell. But this story is incomplete: it offers no 
reason for the rise of the trusts and corporations in the first place. It 
seems unlikely that serendipity created Standard Oil and U.S. Steel. 
The long debate on monopoly and the modern corporation offers two 
other mechanisms. Stock prices would fall in a world where (1) monopoly 
was widespread among publicly traded firms and (2) the antitrust authori-
ties could reliably detect and eliminate monopoly without causing much 
collateral damage. But other implications of that sort of triumph of good 
over evil are not borne out. By the available evidence, early trust-busting 
was typically directed at new, fast-growing industries, and the ability of 
the Sherman Act reliably to detect and fix efficiency-reducing monopoly 
remains undemonstrated to the present day. 
Finally, these results could have been generated if antitrust largely 
missed the textbook monopolies and if efficiency rationales were the 
8 2 Franklin M. Fisher . Organizing Industrial Organization: Reflections on the Handbook 
of Industrial Organizat ion. Brookings Papers Econ. Activity: Microeconomics 205, 220 
(1991). In fact, the volume covering empirical and policy issues has no index entry for 
" an t i t r u s t . " 2 Handbook of Industrial Organization (Richard Schmalensee and Robert Wil-
lig, eds . 1989). Ironically, one of the editors served as chief economist of the Antitrust 
Division from 1989 to 1991. 
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dominant motive for the disputed practices. All three mechanisms could 
have been at work in individual cases, but the last one leaves fewer stray 
ends. 
Future work can go in several directions. First, since actual filings 
capture only a fraction of the turmoil surrounding the trust and corpora-
tion problems during antitrust's classic era, other actions by the presi-
dent, Congress, the courts, private parties, and states may explain some 
stock movements, particularly during the Panic of 1907. Second, other 
periods and related policies are worth studying. The trust question was 
not settled in 1914. It emerged as an issue again and again—during Wil-
son's second term, during Herbert Hoover's and Franklin Delano Roose-
velt's administrations, as well as during Lyndon Johnson's and Richard 
Nixon's presidencies. 8 3 Third, it might be possible to obtain independent 
measures of the degree of monopolization and efficiency by industry and 
relate these to the stock-price declines. That strategy is likely to have a 
higher payoff with periods more recent than the turn of the century be-
cause the industry data are better and because many more firms have 
quoted stock prices. 
8 3 In a related article, Bittlingmayer, supra note 78, I look at qua.ierly returns for the 
period 1904-45, in particular the policy reversal under Hoover announced on Friday, Octo-
ber 25. 1929, and the aggressive regime of enforcement under Thurman Arnold in the late 
1930s. 
